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Abstract—Is the dramatic increase in Internet use associated
with a commensurate rise in democracy? Few previous studies
have drawn on multiple perception-based measures of governance
to assess the Internet’s effects on the process of democratization.
This paper uses perception-based time series data on “Voice &
Accountability,” “Political Stability,” and “Rule of Law” to pro-
vide insights into democratic tendency. The results of regression
analysis suggest that the level of “Voice & Accountability” in a
country increases with Internet use, while the level of “Political
Stability” decreases with increasing Internet use. Additionally,
Internet use was found to increase significantly for countries
with increasing levels of “Voice & Accountability.” In contrast,
“Rule of Law” was not significantly affected by a country’s level
of Internet use. Increasing cell phone use did not seem to affect
either “Voice & Accountability,” “Political Stability” or “Rule
of Law.” In turn, cell phone use was not affected by any of
these three measures of democratic tendency. When limiting our
analysis to autocratic regimes, we noted a significant negative
effect of Internet and cell phone use on “Political Stability” and
found that the “Rule of Law” and “Political Stability” metrics
drove ICT adoption.
Index terms—cell phone, democracy, fixed effects model, ICT,
internet
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the globalization of the Internet have a democratizing
effect? The question has already been posed by numerous
studies but these have largely taken the form of qualitative case
studies and/or large theoretical analyses. In terms of a rigorous,
quantitative establishment of the democratization effects of the
Internet, however, the jury is still out [1]. At the heart of
this debate, moreover, lies a more fundamental question about
the essence of democracy. In fact, “unless we are clear about
what democracy means to us, and what kind of democracy we
envision, technology is as likely to stunt as to enhance the civic
polity” [2]. The purpose of this paper is to contribute more
rigorous data-driven analysis to the literature on Internet and
democracy since “there is no doubt that rigorous and data-
driven analysis of this relationship will benefit scholars and
policymakers alike” [1].
Previous research on the topic of Internet and democracy
can be characterized as lacking a serious perusal of the
democracy and regime transitions literature. To be sure, “the
trouble with the zealots of technology as an instrument of
democratic liberation is not that they misconceive technology
but that they fail to understand democracy” [2]. ‘In other
words, “it turns out there is no simple general answer to
the question: Is the technology democratizing?’ until we have
made clear what sort of democracy we intend.” We address this
question first before proceeding with a more detailed literature
review.
Barber’s notion of “strong democracy” comprises the careful
and prudent judgment of citizens who participate in deliber-
ative, self-governing communities. Schmitter and Karl write
that, “modern political democracy is a system of governance
in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the
public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the compe-
tition and cooperation of their elected representatives”[3]. The
two authors emphasize that citizens are the most distinctive
element in democracies. “All regimes have rulers and a public
realm, but only to the extent that they are democratic do
they have citizens” [3]. In contemporary studies of democracy
and particularly in pluralist theory, “a vibrant civil society
is usually regarded as an essential for good governance
and effective democratic consolidation” [4]. In other words,
regular elections are not sufficient. As Zakaria noted, illiberal
democracies have free elections but citizens remain cut off
from real power due to the lack of civil liberties [5].
Huber et al. write that the most basic feature of democracy
is power sharing [6]. They identify three clusters of power
as primarily relevant for the chances of democracy: (1) the
balance of power in civil society; (2) the balance of power
between state and society; and (3) the transnational balance of
power that shape the first two and constrain political decision-
making. By remaining diverse and independent of the state,
political participation by civil society acts as a channel of
public voice and accountability, and a way of challenging
and checking the unbridled power of authoritarian regimes
[4]. The structure of state-society relations is equally relevant
for democracy. As Huber et al. note, “the power of the state
needs to be counterbalanced by the organizational strength of
the civil society to make democracy possible; the state must
not be so strong and autonomous from all social forces as
to overpower civil society and rule without accountability.”
Clearly then a governing body that fails to follow the “rule
of law,” should not be considered democratic [3]. These
elements of democracy are not sufficient conditions for a stable
democracy, but they are necessary and indispensable to the
persistence of democratic governance.
The italicized terms above represent the fundamentals be-
hind the sort of democracy we intend: active citizen par-
ticipation, good governance, accountability, power sharing,
balance of power and rule of law. The few quantitative studies
that do exist on Internet and democracy tend to aggregate
these fundamentals of democracy into a single index. Doing
so means these lose important information on how these
individual components of democracy may be affected by the
growing prevalence of global Internet access. Furthermore,
past quantitative and qualitative studies tend to focus primarily
on the impact of the Internet on established democracies. They
also focus on the 1990s almost exclusively, a serious limitation
that remains surprisingly understated in the literature. Equally
problematic in the current literature is the interchangeable
use of the terms “Internet” and “information revolution.” The
terms are purposefully not differentiated on the basis that the
predominant feature of the information society is the spread
of the Internet. While this is true of Western democracies, it
is certainly not true for the majority of developing, nondemo-
cratic countries, where cell phones are the most widely spread
communication technology after radios [7]. Indeed, the irony is
that “those who might most benefit from the net’s democratic
and informational potential are least likely to have access to
it, the tools to gain access, or the educational background to
take advantage of the tools” [2].
This paper seeks to redress each of these shortcomings.
First, since the boundaries of the term “democracy,” and how
it is measured, is subject to lively debate, we use multiple
perception-based measures of governance for our dependent
variables. Governance indicators provide a better set of proxies
for the sort of democracy we intend as identified above. We
therefore draw on the following three World Bank indicators:
(1) Voice and Accountability (VA) measuring perceptions
of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to par-
ticipate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media; (2)
Rule of Law (RL) measuring perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence; and (3). Political Stability
and Absence of Violence (PS) measuring perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically motivated violence and terrorism. These metrics are
drawn from the World Bank Governance Indicators Research
Database (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/).
Second, we draw on data from 2000 through 2006, a time
when Internet access and cell phone use is significantly more
prevalent and globalized than in the 1990s. If a statistically
significant relationship between Internet and democracy does
exist, then it is more likely to manifest itself now and not in the
1990s. Third, we draw on both Internet and cell phone data per
100 inhabitants per 181 countries to assess the impact of the
information revolution on democratization. We use regression
analysis to determine whether Internet or cell phone use has
had a correlative effect on measures of democratic tendency.
We also model whether the collection of democratic measures
has had a correlative effect on Internet or cell phone use.
The paper is structured as follows: the first section reviews
the current debate and literature on Internet and democracy.
The second section explicates the datasets used in this study
while the third section formalizes the statistical models em-
ployed in the regression analysis. Section four reviews the
results and provides an interpretation of the findings. The fifth
and final section concludes the study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The Internet and democracy literature comprises two distinct
schools of thought each comprising a host of qualitative
research and some quantitative inquiry. In this section we
review in some detail the qualitative and quantitative literatures
that have contributed to both schools of thought over the past
ten to fifteen years. In so doing, we compare and contrast the
main arguments along with the respective findings. As noted
in the introduction, one common shortcoming of the Internet
and democracy literature is the tendency to oversimplify our
understanding of democracy. The purpose of this literature
review is thus to redress this gap evident in previous studies.
The first school of thought is often referred to as the
more populist school of thought. This strand of the literature
subscribes to the viewpoint that the Internet has democratic
relevance and impact [8], [9], [10], [11]. According to these
authors, the Internet will decentralize access to communication
and information while increasing citizen access [12]. Best
and Wade write that “the Internet’s collective characteristics
(e.g., low cost, multidirectional capability, etc.), helps make
this possible.” We first review the qualitative literature that
comprises this school of thought followed by quantitative
studies.
Dahl previously observed that telecommunications tech-
nologies have a key role in making possible the advanced
democratic country, where policy is firmly anchored in the
judgment of the “demos” [13]. In his list of the procedural
minimal conditions that must be present for modern political
democracy to exist, Dahl thus argues that citizens should
have the right to seek out alternative sources of information.
Rheingold has dubbed the Internet as “the great equalizer”
because it can “equalize the balance of power between citizens
and power barons” [14]. The idea here “is that the Internet
will serve as a mass audience, and will politicize them in the
process” [12]. Anderson et al. draw on sociological research
to show that electronic networks lead to the “break-down of
status-based social structures” and “increased participation in
discussion, decision-making, and task processes by those who
typically are political or economically disadvantaged” [15].
Etzioni sees in the Internet the possibility of an advancement
of the state of public affairs through “teledemocracy” [16].
Other scholars claim that the Internet will “enable a Jeffer-
sonian revolution” [17]. Grossman argues that a “third epoch
of democracy is arriving by the hand of technology,” and
claims that a “new, hybrid electronic republic’ is now forming
to displace the creation of Montesquieu, Locke, Madison and
their contemporaries” [18], [12]. The practice of “electronic
democracy,” according to Browning, will differ substantially
from previous renderings of democracy [19]. Perhaps the most
provocative claim associated with this more populist school of
thought is the one made by Negroponte, who argues that the
nation-state will evaporate as a consequence of the information
revolution [20]. Snider suggests that citizens need only be
potentially informed in order to hold government accountable
[21].
Barber opines that by favoring decentralization, the mul-
tiplication of choice, and consumer sovereignty, new tech-
nologies such as the internet or cell phone have already,
albeit inadvertently, benefited democratic political culture [2].
According to Barber, “democracy is a form of government
that depends on information and communication. It is obvious
then that new technologies of information and communications
can be nurturing to democracy. They can challenge passivity,
they can enhance information equality, they can overcome
sectarianism and prejudice, and they can facilitate participation
in deliberative political processes.” Hill and Hughes argue that
those who subscribe to the populist school have reasons to be
optimistic: “If the mere fact that political discourse against
repressive governments is taking place is a good in itself, then
the utopians have reason to celebrate [22]. Perhaps the Internet
will bring about a wider democratic revolution in the world”
[22].
Bimber is more cautious, arguing that while the Internet is
accelerating the process of issue group formation and action
(in America), the structure of political power has not been
revolutionized or qualitatively transformed into a new epoch of
democracy [12]. According to Bimber, other scholars believe
that the Internet has a “transformative potential” because it
facilitates a kind of “one-to-one interaction among citizens
and between citizens and government.” Along these lines,
some scholars such as Corrado and Firestone write that the
Internet has the potential to promote “unmediated” commu-
nication and thereby decrease citizens’ reliance on officials
and organizations [23]. In sum, what distinguishes the populist
enthusiasm for the Internet is the “idea that elites and political
intermediaries will grow less important” [12].
In the more contemporary, qualitative literature, Steele and
Stein, argue that the Internet amplifies trends in international
relations [24]. Rosenau and Johnson address the impact of the
Internet at both the individual and international level [25]. At
the individual level, the authors argue that the Internet can be
used as a tool to organize collectively to effect social and polit-
ical change around the world (see http://www.DigiActive.org,
for example). At the international level, the authors make the
bold claim that the Internet has “contributed to the rise of a
more multicentric world structure in which nation-states have
seen their preeminence lessen and non-governmental actors
take the stage” [1]. The salient point here is that groups and
individuals can far more efficiently form coalitions of conse-
quence with a range of powerful collectives. As Best and Wade
rightly note, there are obvious democratic elements to this,
including the need for “nation-states to provide democratic
rights to their citizens so as to build legitimacy on the global
stage” [1].
We now turn to the quantitative studies that comprise the
first school of thought. One of the earlier statistical studies
on this side of the literature was carried out by Kedzie,
who provides an account of how information communication
technologies contributed to the “third wave” of democracy
[26]. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and the prolifer-
ation of new democracies in Eurasia, the mainstream theory
of democratization held that democracy followed economic
growth and development [27]. To be sure, one of the few robust
findings in the literature is that democracy is more likely in
more developed countries [28], [29], [30]. Longdregan and
Poole have also shown that the most significant predictor of
transitions to authoritarianism is poverty [31], [32]. “In short,
after 20 years of observation and analysis during the third wave
of academic interest in democratization, we can be reasonably
certain that a positive relationship between development and
democracy exists, though we do not know why” [33].
Kedzie, however, was more interested in testing another
potential causal mechanism, the “dictator’s dilemma” hypoth-
esis, which suggests that the globalization of markets places
pressure on authoritarian regimes to keep their countries’
communication borders open. He reasoned that the ensuing
massive flow of information would not only allow for “the
efficient passage of commercial information, but also for more
’democratic’ information” [1]. As Bimber observes, the most
important predictions about the Internet’s impact on politics
amount to “causal claims regarding the effect of information
flow on political participation and the organization of interests”
[12]. Other scholars have made related arguments. Webster,
for example, writes that the Internet has helped to facilitate
a new form of capitalism called “information capitalism” in
which global labor markets require highly flexible workers
who continuously adapt and learn [34]. Regimes that impose
restrictions on information capitalism forgo the financial re-
turns possible by tapping into the information economy [35],
[36], [37].
In his study, Kedzie employs regression analysis to compare
how much of the variation in democracy is explained by both
traditional predictors of democracy and the strength of Internet
diffusion by drawing on data from 144 countries [26]. For
his set of control variables, Kedzie included more traditional
predictors of democracy including economic development,
education, human development and health. He also included
indicators of pre-Internet information communication tech-
nologies (ICTs). His results suggest that the Internet is indeed
a strong predictor of democracy, more so than traditional
determinants of democracy. In a follow up study, Richards
assessed the relationship between the Internet and physical
integrity [38]. His findings support Kedzie’s. However, the
latter study faces an important limitation since Kedzie’s (rather
simple) longitudinal analysis draws on data from 1993. At
this point during the early 1990s, the Internet was hardly
globalized.
Best and Wade recognize this important short coming in
Kedzie’s study and therefore explore the global effect of the
Internet on democracy over a ten year period, 1992−2002 [1].
They aggregate political and civil rights data from Freedom
House to formulate a democracy index, which serves as their
dependent variable. The number of Internet users per 1, 000
represents their independent variable while the following mea-
sures are used as control variables: GDP per capita, education
and literacy rates, life expectancy, urbanization, prevalence of
non-Internet ICTs. Their analysis shows that a statistically
powerful correlation exists between Internet diffusion and
level of democratization. “The more salient observation to
make, however, is that while economic prevalence and liter-
acy maintain relatively constant correlations with democracy,
the correlation for Internet prevalence gradually strengthens,
almost to the same level as economic prevalence” [1].
The authors suggest that this dynamic reflects the grow-
ing significant relationship between Internet prevalence and
democracy: “perhaps this is an indication that the Internet
has come of age as a correlate of democracy” [1]. Indeed,
they posit that this growth in correlation strength might “be
expected given the positive network externalities, the network
effect’ that is a salient property of the Internet” [1]. However,
the coefficients from the regression analysis reveal that Internet
usage is only able to predict a minimal amount of the variation
in democracy: “to generate one point of democracy, an extra
500 Internet users per 1,000 citizens is needed, or an extra
$5, 882 of GDP per capita is needed” [1]. The scale of democ-
racy runs from 2 to 14. In terms of democracy’s traditional
determinants, GDP was a weak predictor while literacy turned
out to have no significance whatsoever. The other control
variables used were either insignificant or internally correlated.
While Best and Wade’s important contribution to the litera-
ture on Internet and democracy is one of the few contemporary
quantitative studies carried out thus far, their approach does
face a number of important limitations [1]. For one, their
democracy index needs to be unpacked and “its constituent
components, such as freedom of the press, openness of the
electoral process,” for example, tested against traditional de-
terminants of democracy to determine whether one compo-
nent provides more explanatory power than others. Another
limitation of their data is the fact that it extends only to
2002. This should be updated today due to the rapid pace
of ICT diffusion over the past several years. In addition,
several scholars have criticized the Freedom House data with
regards to conceptualization, measurement and aggregation
issues (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Rydland et al., 2008).
Furthermore, as discussed subsequently, there is little to no
variation in the Freedom House data, which makes meaningful
statistical analysis more difficult.
In contrast to the populist literature, the second school
of thought disputes the majority of claims that exist vis-a`-vis
the relationship between Internet and democracy. The counter-
arguments are based on both qualitative and quantitative re-
search. In terms of qualitative research, several scholars argue
that the Internet is merely an extension of the ruling class and
centralized control [39], [40], [41], [34], [42]. According to
Neuman, even if the increase of ICTs had led to an increase
in the motivation to communicate - which he argues has not
happened - then ICTs would have become centralized by
government turning them into social control mechanisms [43].
Scholars who subscribe to this school of thought maintain that
mass media information technologies discourage collective
behavior, ”unless the rise in couch potatoes can be considered
a social movement” [44], [45], [46].
In contrast to Snider’s argument about the mere potential of
citizens being informed acting as a source of accountability, if
power is measured by the potential for “monopoly and control
over information and communication, it is evident that the new
technology can become a dangerous facilitator of tyranny”
[21], [2]. Indeed, while the Internet may enable citizens to
subvert political hierarchy, Barber notes that with increased
participation comes the peril of political and economic surveil-
lance. The populist school of thought is often blind to “how
easily liberating technologies become tools of repression” [2].
Bimber rejects the supposition that the Internet will
have significant effects on public life, point out that “both
theory and empirical evidence cast grave doubt on the
communication-action connection at the core of the populist
theory” [12]. Lippmann argued that the capacity of ICTs to
recreate politics is constrained by human nature, ie. cognitive
processing, and not by the technical properties of the media
themselves [47]. The Internet, then, is no different than other
ICTs even if the new medium differs from previous technolo-
gies in a fundamental way, namely allowing social bonding
to occur asynchronously. In sum, the Internet is “hardly
producing the first dramatic expansion in communication:
telephone, radio, and television also expanded communication
profoundly.” There seems no compelling reason to believe
that the communication capacity of the Net will have such a
dramatically different effect than have other advances in point-
to-point and broadcast communication” [12]. Moreover, Page
argues, new ICTs may very well overcome spatial distance
but his far from sufficient for establishing vibrant forms of
political communication and deliberation [48].
Furthermore, “if democracy is to be understood as delib-
erative and participatory activity on the part of responsible
citizens, it will have to resist the innovative forms of dem-
agoguery that accompany innovative technology and that are
too often overlooked by enthusiasts [2]. Aristotle wrote that
the basis of a democratic state is liberty. Barber adds that a
“free society is free only to the degree that its citizens are
informed and that communication among them is open and
informed [2]. However, recent research and empirical work
confirms that governments increasingly have the upper hand
in controlling and regulating the impact of the information
revolution [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57],
[58]. As Goldsmith observes, “if governments can raise the
cost of Net transactions, they can regulate the transactions”
[59]. Beilock and Dimitrova found that countries with lower
Freedom House scores for civil liberties had significantly
lower Internet usage (even when controlling for economic
development) [60].
De Mesquita and George Downs also argue that government
elites (e.g., in Singapore) have learned to “stifle the bottom-up
democratic potential of the Internet and still promote economic
growth, contrary to Kedzie’s dictator’s dilemma argument”
[61]. As Bimber notes, the “central theoretical problem for
the populist claim is the absence of a clear link between
increases in information and increases in popular political
action” [12] To this end, McLuhan’s old dictum may be wrong:
“the medium is not the whole message. Content matters, and
there is simply no overwhelming reason to believe that a
new medium will necessarily enhance the political quality
of communicative content” [12]. In short, “technology need
not inevitably corrupt democracy, but its potential for benign
dominion cannot be ignored” [2].
In terms of quantitative analysis, Scheufele and Nisbet’s
2002 statistical study suggests that the Internet does not
increase democracy. “Through linear regression, they find
that mass media broadcasting (e.g., television, newspapers)
plays a far more effective role than the Internet in promoting
democratic citizenship” [1], [62]. Given that an established
body of quantitative research on this topic has yet to material-
ize, Scheufele and Nisbet do caution against generalizing the
results of their study, which focused exclusively on the United
States. Other scholars interested in this line of research have
questioned the supposed direction of causation drummed up
by the populist school of thought. Using multiple measures
of regime type, Milner’s statistical analysis demonstrates that,
ceteris paribus, democracies permit much greater online ac-
cess, both in terms of Internet users per capita and Internet
hosts per capita [63]. To this end, the information revolution
may merely be reinforcing pre-existing dynamics.
Milner’s study uses data from 1991 − 2001 to measure the
influence of regime type of adoption of the internet. This study
attempts to address a slightly different question—whether
there is a relationship between measures of democracy and
ICT penetration—but we build on her work by extending the
range of years to 2006 (although we begin measurement in
2000). We adopt a fixed effect model and control for the time
component directly in the model.
Beilock and Dimitrova develop a model to explain global
country differences in Internet use using income, measures of
freedom, region dummies, and development indices [60]. Their
data is a cross section from 2001 and does not take democratic
variables directly into account.
Best and Wade ask the question closest to that addressed
in this paper [1]. They ask whether Internet penetration has
an effect on the level of democracy in a country. Their study
is global in scope and uses time series data from 1992 to
2002. We seek to build on their work by using data from
2000 to 2006 and using the World Bank Governance metrics
as our measures of democratic tendency. Best and Wade
combined the Freedom House metrics of political rights and
civil liberties as their measure of democratic tendency. As
described subsequently we feel the Freedom House data are
not well suited to a regression study such as this one.
A. Our Approach to Measuring Democratic Tendency Using
the World Bank Governance Indicators
Dahl characterizes a government with power vested in a
plurality as follows [13]:
1) Control over governmental decisions about policy is
constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2) Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed
in relatively frequent, fair and free elections in which
coercion is quite limited.
3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in these
elections.
4) Most adults also have the right to run for the public
offices for which candidates run in these elections.
5) Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom
of expression, particularly political expression, including
criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government,
the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and
the dominant ideology.
6) They also have access to alternative sources of informa-
tion that are not monopolized by the government or any
other single group.
7) Finally, they have an effectively enforced right to form
and join autonomous associations, including political
associations, such as political parties and interest groups,
that attempt to influence the government by competing
in elections and by other peaceful means.
The first four points largely describe procedural aspects of
a democracy, whereas the last three points delineate the com-
munication aspect necessary for a well-functioning democratic
regime. In fact, Diamond goes further and notes that “[s]ome
insist on a fairly robust (though still procedural) definition
of democracy, like Dahl’s ‘polyarchy.’ By this conception,
democracy requires not only free, fair, and competitive elec-
tions, but also the freedoms that make them truly meaningful
(such as freedom of organization and freedom of expression),
alternative sources of information, and institutions to ensure
that government policies depend on the votes and preferences
of citizens” [64]. Expanding on Dahl, Diamond has developed
his own list of characteristics of a democracy [65]:
1) Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations
lies, in fact as well as in constitutional theory, with
elected officials (and not democratically unaccountable
actors or foreign powers); in particular, the military is
subordinate to the authority of elected civilian officials.
2) Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in
fact, by the autonomous power of other government in-
stitutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament,
and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability).
3) Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a sig-
nificant opposition vote and the presumption of party
alternation in government, but no group that adheres to
constitutional principles is denied the right to form a
party and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds
and other rules exclude small parties from winning
representation in parliament).
4) Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups
(as well as historically disadvantaged majorities) are not
prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their
interests in the political process or from speaking their
language or practicing their culture.
5) Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple,
ongoing channels for expression and representation of
their interests and values, including diverse, independent
associations and movements, which they have the free-
dom to form and join.
6) There are alternative sources of information (including
independent media) to which citizens have (politically)
unfettered access.
7) Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opin-
ion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demon-
stration, and petition.
8) Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though
they are invariably unequal in their political resources).
9) Individual and group liberties are effectively protected
by an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary, whose
decisions are enforced and respected by other centers of
power.
10) The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified deten-
tion, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their
personal lives not only by the state but also by organized
nonstate or anti-state forces.
Like Dahl, Diamond includes procedural aspects of a demo-
cratic regime (points one through three) and he enshrines what
he considers essential communication requirements in points
four through seven. These latter points can be characterized as
approximating a “freedom of expression” or “political voice”
aspect to democracy. We found the World Bank governance
metric of “Political Voice and Accountability” to represent
Diamond’s notion well in that it measures “perceptions of the
extent to which a country’s citizen’s are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and a free media” [66]. Like all the
World Bank Governance metrics, it was built from surveys
and other sources of data within each country. These sources
give an idea of “freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech,
publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition” present in
the country, although they do not measure the proliferation
of channels of communication that Diamond enunciates. The
World Bank governance indicators metrics are based on 35
data sources some of which yield “subjective or perceptions-
based data” including that from “household and firm survey
respondents, as well as thousands of experts working for the
private sector, NGOs, and public sector agencies” [66].
In points eight through ten, Diamond gives a description
of the role of law in a democracy. The World Bank has a
governance metric that expresses some of this: “measuring
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” [66].
This approximates the World Banks “Rule of Law” metric and
we propose it as an empirical measure of Diamond’s points
eight through ten.
The World Bank also has a metric measuring political sta-
bility: “perceptions of the likelihood that the government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”
[66]. While not enumerated in either Diamond’s or Dahl’s
lists, Amartya Sen postulated an empirical correlation between
democratic regimes and political stability [67]. He notes both
the “political incentives provided by democratic governance”
to prevent crises and specifically that the “positive role of
political and civil right applies to the prevention of economic
and social disasters in general” [67]. Thus we investigate the
World Banks “Political Stability” metric as another measure
of democratic tendency.
In measuring the relationship between ICT penetration and
these democratic variables, it is clear that country wealth is a
confounding factor that sound be taken into account: wealthier
countries are both more likely to be democratic and to be
the heavier users of both the Internet and the cell phone. We
gathered gross domestic product (GDP) data from 2000 to
2006 from the International Monetary Fund. The GDP data is
purchasing parity adjusted to be directly comparable between
countries.
Diamond notes that country size is highly correlated with
regime type: “countries with populations under one million are
much more likely to be both democracies and liberal democ-
racies. Two-thirds of these countries are liberal democracies,
while only 30 percent of countries with populations over one
million are. Among the larger 150 countries, only half are
democracies, while 70 percent of the small countries are. The
countries with populations over one million are about twice as
likely as small states to have an electoral authoritarian regime
and half again as likely to have a closed authoritarian regime.”
[64], [65]. Because of this, we included population in our
models to control for country size. The population data for
2000 to 2006 was also gathered from the IMF.1
B. Limitations of The Data
The ICT data is gathered from the International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU). The ITU requested the number of
Internet and cell phone users from each country. This raises
a host of questions about the reliability of the data since it
1Both the IMF GDP and population data are available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/
is self-reported by the country. Perhaps the country has an
incentive to under or over-report? It is plausible that some
countries have more reliable data collection mechanisms in
place than others. With one report per country per year, the
data are highly granular, but they do seem to follow steady
trends, and steadily upwards in ICT adoption.
The World Bank did not calculate governance metrics for
2001. We carried out simple linear interpolation to provide a
data point for each country in this year. We made the decision
to do this since there are only six time points from which
to interpolate, and only one, the year 2000, falls before our
missing data. This creates data that are “too smooth” for year
2001 since they have been created from our pre-existing data
and this will make our results appear more precise than they
in fact are. We argue that this effects is minor since the World
Bank data are themselves aggregated from a large number of
sources, and thus less subject to noise than using a single
source would be.
Other metrics of the level of democratic rights exist, such as
the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” metric. Freedom
House carries out an annual global survey of political rights
and civil liberties. We choose not to use this as a measurement
of democratic tendency for two reasons. We felt that the World
Bank Governance Indicators could be well grounded in the
theory of democracy as measures of democracy. Secondly, the
Freedom House measures have some quantitative limitations.
A certain amount of inertia is built into the measurements so
that it is difficult for a country to move much from one year to
the next. For both political rights and civil liberties a country
is scaled from 0 to 7, giving only 8 possible outcomes for
a country. Combining these two factors leads to a database
that does not shift very much from year to year. In the years
of our study, 2000 to 2006, of the 193 countries surveyed by
Freedom House (after subtracting the 9 with missing values
for both political rights and civil liberties for the entire time
series), 105 had no change in their scores for political rights
and 86 had no changes in their civil rights scores. The average
variance of those that did exhibit some change from 2000 to
2006 was 0.48 for political rights and 0.32 for civil liberties.
This means the majorities of countries, if they changed at all,
changed by perhaps one point on the 8 point scale.
Having more years of data, including 2007, would improve
our modeling. At the time of this writing, the World Bank
Governance metrics were not available for 2007.
The IMF estimated some of the population number for some
of the countries. It is likely this has the effect of providing
population data that is smoother than it would otherwise be.
Note also that both ICT measures, the Internet and Cell Phone
use, are measures per 100 inhabitants. We emphasize that this
must be carefully noted in interpretation of the regression
results, since we use population as an independent variable.
We also note that even though the ITU collects Internet use
statistics for each country, what it really means to use the
Internet can vary by country due to filtering, censoring, and
other restrictions on access. The OpenNet Intiative at the
Berkman Center for Internet and Society monitors the filtering
activity for 40 of the countries most actively engaged in
repressing internet activity [68], [69]. Although not as extreme
as the case of the Internet, cell phone use can be restricted
by the government as well, and will differ from country to
country. Zuckerman gives several examples of government
crackdowns on mobile phone use: Belarus’s reported shutdown
of their SMS network in March 2006, reports of Ethiopian
cell phone blocking during the 2005 election protests, and
Cambodian blocking of SMS for two days before their 2007
elections [7].
North Korea and Cuba were dropped from the study since
official data is not reported for these countries. It is generally
known that there is very little internet access in Cuba, and little
to none in North Korea and these are both regimes with little
democracy. If we had been able to include these countries in
our estimation of the models, this would likely have bolstered
our results.2 Details of the data cleaning and amalgamation
process are on the study website at http://www.stodden.net/
ICTD.
Our population data was obtained from the International
Monetary Fund and contains a sparse number os missing
values. The IMF has made estimates of their missing data
to complete the dataset.3
III. EMPIRICAL MODELING
Our data comprises a panel containing N different times
series each consisting of T observations. The number of
countries, N , is 181, and T , the number of years in our study,
is 7. A fixed effects model of our democratic measures’ effect
on ICT penetration follows:
ICTit = β0 + β1RLit + β2V Ait + β3PSit+
β4POPit + β5GDPit + β6MFit+
γtTD + ξiCD + it
i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T.
In this paper we model the penetration of Internet or cell
phone usage per 100 inhabitants, ICT , as a function of the
World Bank democratic measures (Rule of Law, Voice and
Accountability, and Political Stability)4, country size, country
wealth, and the male/female ratio in the country.
ICT is one of “Internet Use” or “Cell Phone Use.”5 GDPit
is the per capita Gross Domestic Product for country i at
year t, adjusted for purchasing power parity.6 POPit is the
2Countries with missing values also tended to support our hypothesis:
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Comoros, Kiribati, Serbia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Timor-
Leste, and Tonga. Cuba, Iraq, Montenegro, and North Korea simply did not
furnish enough data for inclusion in the study.
3A precise explanation of their data interpolation procedure was not readily
available. See http://www.econstats.com/weo/V023.htm
4Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
5The data used in this study is available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/informationsharing/
6The data are available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx
population of country i at year t and MFit is the male/female
gender ratio.7
β0 is the intercept term for country i, and γtTD and ξiCD
are a time effect and a country effect, respectively. The effect
of time is controlled for by dummy variables: TDt is 1 for year
t and 0 otherwise. Similarly CDi is a dummy variable that is
1 for country i and 0 otherwise, controlling for the differences
between countries. Finally, it is a disturbance term with
distribution N(0, σ2i ), which we assume to be uncorrelated
across country cross sections. In this study there are N = 181
countries and T = 7 years.
A. Autocorrelation in Panel Data
A panel regression model of this type is subject to possible
autocorrelation between subsequent observations because of
the time series components. In a regression model as described
above, it is possible to ’discover’ what Granger and Newbold
[70] termed “spurious” relationships between the variables.
That is, tests of significance on estimated coefficients may
indicate a significant result, when in fact none is present.
Granger and Newbold suggest economic time series data may
be especially prone to autocorrelation since they tend to be
non-stationary, in that it is not uncommon for the process
generating the data to depend on the time it was sampled.
For example, economic time series are commonly subject
to seasonal or cyclical effects. Time series data that are
not stationary will violate the assumptions of least squares
regression since the variance of the error term will depend
on time and thus introduce a bias into coefficient estimation.8
Granger and Newbold describe a high R2 value and a low
Durbin-Watson statistic as warning signs that the estimated
model may be yielding spurious results.
Thus it is important to determine whether the time series
data in this study are nonstationary. Our data are sampled
yearly suggesting they may avoid annual cyclical effects.
We analyze 181 countries from 2000 to 2006 (with 2001
interpolated for the World Bank variables) and thus have 7
values in each time series. As Granger and Newbold mention,
finely sampled time series tend to exacerbate the cyclical
effects and thus nonstationarity in the data.
As is typical, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was used to
assess nonstationarity in each of our time series. Since Internet
and Cell phone use are increasing rapidly for the vast majority
of the countries in our study, we measured the autoregressive
structure of each time series as stationary around a trend line,
and modeled with one lag. The null hypothesis is that the
data are nonstationary. The test was applied to the ICT and
World Bank data at the country level. For the Internet and
mobile phone data the test rejected the null hypothesis of
nonstationarity for 40 and 35 of 181 countries respectively,
meaning that for around 20% of the Internet and cell phone
penetration time series, nonstationarity is not evident.9. When
7The gender ratio data was obtained from the Census Department’s Inter-
national Database at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/tables.html
8For a mathematically precise explanation see [70], p. 2.
9The tests were performed at the 10% level
the same test was performed on the World Bank variables, 54,
62, and 60 of 181 rejected nonstationarity for Rule of Law,
Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability, respectively
(about one third of the data). Although there some evidence
of stationarity, it appears that the majority of the time series
included in this study are nonstationary, and it’s potential
biasing of coefficient estimates is a concern.10 The typical
remedy is the difference the data to remove the nonstationarity.
Running the regressions in the above equation allowed us to
carry out tests on the residuals directly to evaluate the level of
autocorrelation. There are two regressions to be run in this
study, modeling Internet penetration and cell phone usage.
Typically the Durbin-Watson test with one lag is used to test
for autocorrelation in the structure of the regression residuals
and the regression with Internet use as a dependent variable
was found to have autocorrelation present, and the cell phone
penetration regression was not, with Durbin-Watson values of
1.86 and 2.01 respectively.11





, where t is the tth residual from the regres-
sion. It follows that 0 < d < 4. A value of 2 indicates
no autocorrelation. To test whether the Durbin-Watson test
statistics could be considered equivalent to 2, the test in the
R statistical software package was used [71].
The adjusted R2 values were 0.9246 and 0.9199, seeming to
fit the Internet regression squarely into Granger and Newbold’s
area of caution: a low Durbin-Watson statistic and a high
R2 value, and also casts some suspicion on the cell phone
regression. Granger and Newbold offer that until “a really
satisfactory procedure is available, we recommend taking first
differences of all variables that appear to be highly autocorre-
lated.” (p. 8.) We carried out this operation on both the Internet
and cell phone use regressions because of the high R2 values
and the nonstationary data in both regressions, even though the
Durbin-Watson statistic did not suggest autocorrelation among
the cell phone regression errors. The plots of the residuals
for both regressions indicate possible heteroskedasticity. This
suggests running the following differenced model:















i = 1, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T.
Running this model for differenced Internet penetration and
differenced mobile phone use did not improve the Durbin-
10Note that a combination of nonstationary time series may in fact be
stationary. This is termed cointegration.
11The p-values for the Durbin-Watson test are generated via a bootstrapping
method and can fluctuate. In this case the p-values were 0.022 for the Internet
regression and 0.962 for the cell phone regression.
TABLE I
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 2000 DATA
Variable Mean Min Max
Internet Use per 100 7.25 0 45.58
Cell Use per 100 16.02 0 81.73
Rule of Law -0.07 -2.02 1.95
Voice & Accountability -0.06 -2.05 1.67
Political Stability -0.08 -2.73 1.54
GDP (PPP per capita) 8,998.10 229.36 55,248.25
POP (millions) 33.20 0.04 1267.43
Gender Ratio (M/F) 100.4 85.3 212.3
Watson statistics. They became 2.16 and 1.92 respectively.12
The adjusted R2 values were reduced to 0.3686 and 0.4059.
Both Durbin-Watson statistics reject the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation at the 5% level. A common method of
controlling for autoregression is using a 2-stage least squares
approach [74], [75]. In the first stage, the autoregressive
structure in the residual is estimated using a model postulating
that the autocorrelation has a single lag structure, specifically:
i = ρ ∗ i−1
where i is the ith residual from the initial regression.
The first stage allows us to find an estimate of ρ, ρˆ using
a least-squares model. In stage 2, ρˆ is used to remove the
autocorrelation in the variables. Each variable, represented as
V AR in the next equation, is then adjusted to create a new
variable, adjV AR, using the formula:
adjV ARi−1 = V ARi − ρˆV ARi−1
Since we are analyzing panel data with both time and
country dimensions, implementation of the autocorrelation was
applied at the country level using different estimates of ρ for
the Internet and cell phone regressions. Carrying this out on the
differenced data increased the Durbin-Watson statistics to 2.24
and 2.18, and autocorrelation is still detected by this test at the
5% level. The adjusted R2 statistics were 0.4292 and 0.3599.
This was our final model analyzed in the following section.
Since autocorrelation has not been eradicated from the data
we interpret our results cautiously and look for corroboration.
IV. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
We used the R statistical package to estimate these models
(version 2.7.2) [71]. The complete set of code and data used
in this study can be found at http://www.stodden.net/ICTD.
Tables I and II present summary statistics of the dependent
variables (Internet and cell phone use per 100 country inhab-
itants) and the World Bank metrics for the countries in 2000
and 2006 respectively.
12Testing the residuals for autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson test is
the typical procedure, when the sample is large. It is also possible to test for
cointegration: whether the combination of time series is stationary. See [72]
and [73].
TABLE II
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 2006 DATA
Variable Mean Min Max
Internet Use per 100 21.66 0.03 92.52
Cell Use per 100 53.19 0.42 138.06
Rule of Law -0.07 -2.00 2.03
Voice & Accountability -0.07 -2.28 1.72
Political Stability -0.08 -2.31 1.60
GDP (PPP per capita) 12,147.70 195.43 76,537.15
POP (millions) 35.67 0.051 1314.48
Gender Ratio (M/F) 100.4 84.3 218.5
TABLE III
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR GLOBAL INTERNET
PENETRATION
Variable Estimate Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law 0.9018 1.1193 0.4207
Voice & Accountability 0.9122 0.8514 0.2844
Political Stability -0.3783 0.5345 0.4793
GDP 0.0004 0.0002 0.0972*
POP -0.0488 0.8123 0.9521
Gender Ratio 0.8212 0.9189 0.3718
A. Modeling Global ICT Penetration as a Function of Demo-
cratic Tendency
We estimated two panel regressions of ICT penetration with
controls for autocorrelation as discussed in the preceding sec-
tion (differencing and the Durbin-Watson correction). Internet
and cell phone use were modeled as functions of demographic
variables along with control variables:















i = 1, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , T.
The regression coefficients for Internet penetration are given
in Table III. The coefficients on the individual country and
time dummy variables are not included for space reasons.13
The most significant coefficient was GDP, and none of the
democratic measures were significant. The positive coefficient
on GDP confirms our intuition that wealthier countries have
higher levels of Internet use.
The same regression was run for cell phone penetration, and
the coefficient estimates are presented in Table IV. Cell phone
use appears not to associated with wealth as Internet use is,
and the male to female gender ratio in the country is strongly
associated with increases in cell phone use, as is the level of
political stability.
The influence of the gender ratio may be driven by outlier
countries: Most countries had a male/female gender ratio of
a little less than 100, implying slightly more females than
males in the population. The coefficient of 4.88 implies that
13The complete regression results can be found online at http://www.
stodden.net/ICTD.
TABLE IV
REGRESSION COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR GLOBAL CELL PHONE
PENETRATION
Variable Estimate Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law -1.4120 2.0333 0.4876
Voice & Accountability -2.458 1.5946 0.1236
Political Stability 2.2823 1.0044 0.0233**
GDP -0.0002 0.0005 0.7061
POP 0.1225 1.4327 0.9319
Gender Ratio 4.8839 1.7342 0.0050***
TABLE V
TOP 10 MALE/FEMALE RATIOS, 2000 AND 2006
Rank Country 2000 Country 2006
1 United Arab Emirates 212.3 United Arab Emirates 218.5
2 Qatar 198.1 Qatar 202.5
3 Kuwait 150.3 Kuwait 152.3
4 Oman 131.3 Maldives 127.3
5 Bahrain 129.9 Bahrain 126.7
6 Saudi Arabia 125 Oman 124.7
7 Maldives 117.3 Saudi Arabia 120.5
8 Bhutan 112.3 Bhutan 111.0
9 Jordan 109.9 Jordan 110.2
10 Djibouti 107.1 Grenada 108.1
as the gender ratio increases by about 5, cell phone usage per
100 inhabitants will increase by one phone. Throughout the
years studied, roughly 7 of the 10 countries with the highest
male/female ratio each year were located in the middle east,
and the ratios at that end of the distribution dwarfed the other
countries’. As displayed in Table VI, it is plausible some of
these values are extreme enough to have a large impact on the
regression fit, although why this did not occur in the internet
regression is not clear. It is also possible the very high gender
ratio values represent a ’middle east effect’ since a number
of those countries are highly represented in the top 10 gender
ratio values. This implies that the coefficient on the gender
ratio variable could represent a high growth in cell phone use
in the middle east. Table VII gives the 2000 and 2006 cell
phone data for these countries. The coefficient indicates that
as the rate of change in the proportion of men increases, so
does the rate of change in cell phone use.
Interestingly, the greater political stability and the lower the
perceived threat of violence, the greater cell phone penetration.
This may represent infrastructural stability if associated with
political stability and thus a measure of investor’s confidence.
It is not clear why this factor would not therefore also be
associated with an increase in Internet use. Perhaps cell phones
are easier to proliferate than access to the Internet and so a
smaller increase in political stability encourages cell phone
increase before Internet increase.
As shown in Tables I and II, the average cell phone
penetration in 2000 was about 16 phones per 100 inhabitants
and in 2006 it was about 53, nearly a three-fold increase. This
is a high rate of increase but, notably, the countries listed
in Table VI (those with the highest male to female gender
ratios) had much higher than average growth in cell phone
penetration. This is quantified in the significant coefficient in
the regression in Table IV, while allowing for the included
TABLE VI
CELL PHONE USE PER 100 INHABITANTS FOR HIGHER GENDER RATIO
COUNTRIES, 2000 AND 2006
Rank Country 2000 Country 2006
1 United Arab Emirates 43.98 United Arab Emirates 118.51
2 Qatar 19.90 Qatar 109.6
3 Kuwait 21.74 Kuwait 91.49
4 Oman 6.63 Maldives 87.88
5 Bahrain 30.61 Bahrain 122.88
6 Saudi Arabia 6.40 Oman 69.59
7 Maldives 2.83 Saudi Arabia 78.05
8 Bhutan 0 Bhutan 9.77
9 Jordan 7.72 Jordan 74.4
10 Djibouti 0.04 Grenada 44.59
confounding factors.
The World Bank measure for political stability is also
significantly positively correlated with increased cell phone
use. This finding suggests that political instability is related
to the mass diffusion of cell phone usage. In other words,
an increase in cell phone availability could increase the
perceived likelihood that the government will be destabilized
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. In their
statistical analysis, Mansfield and Snyder find that the process
of democratization itself is indeed a destabilizing one [76].
“Certainly, the virtues of working democratic structures do not
translate into a carefree path to the stabilization of democracy”
[77]. This finding also supports the arguments presented by
Rosenau and Johnson, as well as Shirky, who opine that the
Internet can be used as a tool by civil society to organize
collectively to effect political change [25], [78].
B. Modeling ICT Penetration as a Function of Democratic
Tendency Among the Most and Least Affluent Countries
Examining ICT penetration for different strata of wealth
may help isolate effects that are characteristic of those groups.
Since wealth is a driver of investment one would expect
GDP to play a role in the country’s readiness and ability to
adopt new communication technologies [79], [80], [81]. As
established in the literature we also found increases in GDP
to be associated with increases in Internet use. We choose
to examine ICT penetration in both the top and bottom 20%
of countries by 2006 GDP more closely. Our focus on these
groups, in particular the bottom quintile, is driven by Mansfield
and Snyder’s work theorizing the instability of emergent and
transitional regimes and the existence of the global digital
divide [82].
Table VII lists the countries that fall into each of these
groups.
As in the previous section we fit a model with an ICT
penetration measure as the explanatory variable, and measures
of democratic tendency and controls as independent variables
for a panel regression over years 2000 to 2006. For the
top wealthiest quintile of countries our model did not yield
statistically significant results for Internet penetration. Table
VIII gives the coefficient estimates. Since these countries are
exceptionally wealthy and relatively stable politically it may
not be a surprise that GDP is not a driver of Internet use, and
TABLE VII
TOP AND BOTTOM 20% OF COUNTRIES BY GDP IN 2006
Top 20% Countries Bottom 20% Countries
Qatar Zimbabwe



































Czech Republic Coˆte d’Ivoire
TABLE VIII
INTERNET PENETRATION, TOP 20% OF GDP (2006)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law -0.3709 5.4055 0.945
Voice & Accountability 4.771 4.0981 0.246
Political Stability -1.0344 2.2760 0.650
GDP 0.0003 0.0004 0.450
POP 1.6791 5.5724 0.764
Gender Ratio -1.7979 3.7568 0.633
nor are the measures of democratic tendency, even though our
subsets contains countries with varying levels of autocratic
control.
Among the least wealthy quintile we fit the same panel
regression model as above. Table IX gives the regression coef-
ficient estimates. Our predictors did not yield highly significant
coefficient estimates with the exception of the World Bank
voice and Accountability metric. Voice and Accountability
is negatively correlated with Internet penetration: implying
that when countries notch up in the Voice and Accountability
ranking, the use of the Internet increases. This seemingly
paradoxical finding may be explained when note that our
analysis is restricted the the lowest quintile of country in
wealth. These countries experience disproportionately greater
TABLE IX
INTERNET PENETRATION, BOTTOM 20% OF GDP (2006)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law 0.3702 0.4081 0.3660
Voice & Accountability -0.8115 0.3656 0.0281**
Political Stability -0.2583 0.1822 0.1585
GDP -0.0002 0.0014 0.9053
POP -0.0309 0.2784 0.9117
Gender Ratio 0.4026 0.3235 0.2155
TABLE X
CELL PHONE PENETRATION, TOP 20% OF GDP (2006)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law 2.354 6.161 0.7029
Voice & Accountability 4.012 4.736 0.3984
Political Stability 5.071 1.887 0.0612*
GDP -0.0008 0.0005 0.1071
POP -2.896 6.483 0.6558
Gender Ratio 2.8300 4.3690 0.5182
political turmoil and it may be the case that countries with
higher Voice and Accountability rankings have been reluctant
to permit the growth of the Internet in their milieu.
Table X gives the coefficient estimates from the panel
regression for cell phone penetration for the top 20% of
wealthiest countries. There is a statistically significant effect in
the World Bank metric of Political Stability: greater Political
Stability is associated with an increase in cell phone use per
inhabitant. This result seems intuitive as political stability is
historically associated with greater investment in communica-
tions infrastructure and is consistent with our earlier regression
on cell phone use. This suggests the wealthiest countries may
be driving the correlation between political stability and cell
phone penetration. None of the other variables were found
to have a statistically significant relationship with cell phone
penetration in the wealthiest countries.
Among the poorest countries, growth in Voice and Ac-
countability had a statistically significant negative effect on
growth in cell phone penetration. Although consistent with
the Internet penetration regression results for this group of
countries, the paradox remains as to the increase in per capita
cell phone use as Voice and Accountability decreases. It is
plausible citizens desire newer forms of ICT when Voice
and Accountability is restricted. Another explanation may be
that although not all countries in the bottom quintile are
autocratic, a significant proportion are and cell phone use may
facilitate the mobilization, organization and coordination of
resistance against autocratic rule. Interestingly, the voice and
accountability metric is not a significant predictor globally, yet
is significant for types of ICT among the poorest countries.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper is the first to our knowledge that uses recent
Internet and cell phone use data in an empirical study of
their relationship to democratic tendency. Previous studies uses
measures of Internet use that ended in 1993 [26], [38]. Best
and Wade’s data reached only to 2002. This paper is also the
first to the best of our knowledge that measures ICT diffusion
TABLE XI
CELL PHONE PENETRATION, BOTTOM 20% OF GDP (2006)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error p-value
Rule of Law 0.3938 0.4004 0.3271
Voice & Accountability -0.8455 0.3733 0.0251**
Political Stability -0.2776 0.1771 0.1193
GDP -0.0002 0.0014 0.9000
POP -0.0468 0.2815 0.8683
Gender Ratio 0.3913 0.3251 0.2308
as a function of democratic indicators. Previous research has
focused on whether ICT use predicts democratic measures.
These results support Bimbers assertions that the structure
of political power has not been revolutionized or transformed
into a new epoch of democracy [12]. Evidence can be found
for both the populist thread in the literature and the notion that
ICTs may act as an extension of the ruling class.
We found a statistically significant positive relationship
between the rate of diffusion of the cell phone and the World
Bank’s “Political Stability” measure capturing perceptions
regarding the likelihood that a government will be destabilized
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. Political
Stability continues to have a significant positive relationship
with the rate of cell phone use among the most affluent 20%
of countries, but that relationship does not hold among the
wealthiest countries. The “Voice and Accountability” indicator
which measures perceptions of the extent to which citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well
as freedom of expression, association and of the media,
was a significant negative predictor of the rate of cell and
Internet diffusion among the poorest quintile of countries. The
diffusion of ICT access did not have any significant influence
on “Rule of Law” while the increasing availability of cell
phones were shown to have no influence on any of the three
World Bank indicators.
Recall that the Rule of Law metric measures perceptions of
the extent to which individuals have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society—in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts as well
as the likelihood of crime and violence. This measure was orig-
inally included in the analysis based on Diamond’s research on
the characteristics of democracy. However, the findings here
suggest that the increase in “Rule of Law” perceptions does
not influence ICT penetration, either positively or negatively.
In other words, perceptions regarding the “Rule of Law” may
be framed and influenced by factors other than widespread
ICT use.
The populist school of thought believes ICT diffusion will
decentralize access to communication and information while
increasing citizen access [12], while Hill and Hughes claim
that perhaps the Internet will bring about “a wider demo-
cratic revolution in the world” [22]. In our modeling Internet
diffusion was not predicted by our measures of democracy,
implying this revolution has not yet arrived. The rate of cell
phone diffusion was predicted by higher rates of the “Political
Stability” metric. Recall that cell phone are much more widely
used globally than the Internet, so this may be a function of
cell technology’s earlier foothold than the Internet’s. As Inter-
net diffusion catches up to that of cell phone, the democratic
metrics may be found to be predictors of this diffusion. This
is not necessarily inconsistent with the populist thread in the
literature as, according to Bimber, other scholars believe that
the Internet may have a “transformative potential” because
of the “one-to-one interaction among citizens and between
citizens and government” it creates [12].
A paradox is created for the populist school in the finding
that “Voice and Accountability” is negatively correlated with
cell phone diffusion. This can be interpreted in favor of the
argument that ICT diffusion can be centralized by government
turning them into social control mechanisms [43]. As the rate
of Voice and Accountability increases, the rate of diffusion
of ICTs decreases among the poorest and least developed
countries. Rates of cell phone use increase globally with
decreases in political stability, lending further support to the
thesis of ICTs as an extension of ruling class control.
This paradox may be resolved is we consider Page’s view
in 1995, that ICT diffusion may be still too nascent and
insufficient to generate a well functioning system of political
communication and deliberation [48]. It appears we are still
too early to expect a close relationship between a vibrant
public sphere and ICTs globally. As Bimber states, the “central
theoretical problem for the populist claim is the absence of a
clear link between increases in information and increases in
popular political action” [12]. This paper provides evidence
of the existence of this problem and the need to develop our
understanding of this dynamic further.
It would be interesting to tie this research more closely to
development, in line with Sen’s reasoning that “Developing
and strengthening a democratic system is an essential compo-
nent of the process of development,” could extend the empiri-
cal analysis in a fruitful direction. This might mean specifically
testing whether the order in which political and civil rights are
extended as a country emerges from an autocracy affects the
rate of development. This could provide a setting in which to
test the “Lee Thesis,” that political rights should be withheld
until economic development is achieved.
It may be valuable to explore empirical issues further.
Modeling the autocorrelation structure with more than one lag
may help reduce autocorrelation. It would also be interesting
to test for cointegration among these variables. Certainly
documented feedback loops exist between our independent
variables, such as GDP and measures of democracy, and taking
this explicitly into account may improve the modeling [83],
[26]. It is also plausible that feedback loops exist between
ICTs and democratic measures and future modeling could
accommodate this. Further research into the modeling aspects
could estimate models including variables that control for
the different manifestations of cell phone and Internet use in
different countries. A more comprehensive model might ex-
plore possible non-linearities: whether countries with low ICT
adoption rates have different patterns of democratic tendency
than those with high adoption rates.
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